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Abstract 
 
Recent developments in economic theory model intertemporal choice decisions as problems 
of restraining one’s natural impulse to consume today. We use interventions that have been 
shown in the psychology literature to affect impulse control to examine whether this is indeed 
the case for laboratory elicitations of time preference. In other words, is savings behavior 
affected by manipulations of willpower? Our results are mixed, with one widely used 
willpower-reducing intervention increasing subjects’ savings, and with evidence of a 
substantial placebo effects with respect to another intervention based on sugared beverage 
consumption. Since all our treatment effects –which are substantial in magnitude– are driven 
by increases in the intertemporal substitution elasticity (i.e. greater sensitivity to high prices), 
we suspect that the primary mechanism behind them is an increase in subjects’ attention to the 
decision, rather than their ability to resist the temptation to get money sooner. 
JEL-Code: C910, D900. 
Keywords: time preferences, self-control, depletion, sucrose, experiment. 
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1 Introduction
Models of willpower, temptation and self control are now commonplace in economics. They all
aim to capture the visceral push-pull relationship between temptation and prudence that seems a
natural way to conceptualize intertemporal choice situations. Decision makers are modeled as two
conflicting selves (Shefrin and Thaler 1988; Bernheim and Rangel 2004; Fudenberg and Levine
2006) or as receiving extra utility when gratification is immediate (Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and
Rabin 1999). Ozdenoren, Salant and Silverman (2012) explicitly model willpower as a depletable
resource. But how relevant is this modeling approach to fundamental economic behaviors such as
borrowing and saving money? By implementing interventions identified by the psychology litera-
ture as shifters of willpower, our goal in this paper is to ask whether a willpower-based theoretical
paradigm is consistent with across-treatment comparative statics in an abstract borrowing/saving
environment.
Psychological research suggests that willpower –the ability to control the self and refrain from
impulsive or short-sighted decisions– is negatively affected by prior performance of a task that also
requires impulse control. Both dieters who are exposed to the sight of tempting snacks, and those
who are asked to suppress their emotional responses while watching an emotional video, subse-
quently consume more ice cream than dieters engaged in tasks not requiring impulse control (Vohs
and Heatherton 2000). Subjects who were asked to suppress an irrelevant thought for ten minutes
subsequently had greater difficulty resisting alcohol than subjects who performed arithmetic for the
same amount of time (Muraven, Collins and Nienhaus 2002).1 Cognitive load has been found to
increase impulsiveness (Hinson, Jameson and Whitney 2003). Similar effects have been found for
performance on a wide variety of self-control tasks.2 Muraven and Baumeister (2000) argue that
these results are consistent with a resource-depletion model of self-control: “. . . controlling one’s
own behavior requires the expenditure of some inner, limited resource that is depleted afterward.”
(p.247).
More recently, a number of investigators have argued that blood glucose –which constitutes the
1Similar studies of the effects of willpower depletion –manipulated in a variety of ways– on subjects’ management
of food and alcohol consumption include Kahan, Polivy and Herman (2003), Muraven et al. (2005) and Baumeister et
al. (1998).
2These include resisting opportunities to cheat the experimenter for financial gain (Mead et al. 2009), suppressing
stereotypes and prejudice (Gordijn et al. 2004; Richeson and Shelton, 2003; Richeson and Trawalter, 2005; Richeson,
Trawalter, and Shelton, 2005) and restraining aggression (DeWall et al., 2007; Stucke and Baumeister, 2006).
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body’s primary source of energy– is the limited resource that is depleted by acts of self-regulation.
In a series of experiments, Gailliot et al. (2007, 2009) find that engaging in self-control reduces
measured levels of blood glucose, that these induced low glucose levels predict poor performance
on a variety of subsequent self-control tasks, and that consumption of a drink sweetened with su-
crose (relative to an artificially-sweetened drink) mitigates these poor performance levels.3 Effects
of sucrose consumption have been demonstrated on outcomes including inflicting pain on others,
and the use of racial stereotypes and slurs.4
Motivated by the parallels between the psychology experiments and economic theory, this pa-
per considers whether depletion of impulse control and sucrose consumption affect a fundamental
aspect of economic behavior: the allocation of income over time. While it might be tempting to
view intertemporal allocation decisions as simply a case of resisting an impulse to consume more
sooner, it is not at all clear that factors that affect actions like using racial stereotypes or inflict-
ing pain on others will affect financial decisions at all, or in the same way. Adapting the Convex
Time Budget technique developed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) we allow participants in a
laboratory experiment to make a series of choices about payments they will receive sooner or later,
across conditions related to willpower depletion and sugar consumption. A contribution of our pa-
per is to identify which dimensions of a widely used intertemporal utility function –specifically the
discount rate, present bias and intertemporal elasticity of substitution– are affected by our treat-
ment manipulations. Because our procedure allows us to recover the structural parameters this
intertemporal utility function for each subject in our sample, we can translate the abstract concept
of willpower into quantitative statements that are relevant to decisions like mortgage refinancing,
retirement planning, payday advances and human capital investments.
We find that time preferences are sensitive to both our interventions, but we do not find that
willpower depletion makes subjects less patient.5 Instead, participants who have been exposed
to a widely-used willpower-depleting task –the Stroop (1935) test– exhibit increased patience in
the subsequent time preference elicitation. We also find that fasted participants given a sugared
3Glucose is absorbed into the bloodstream at a rate of 30 calories per minute. Metabolization to the brain typically
occurs within ten minutes (Donohoe and Benton 1999).
4See Gailliot and Baumeister (2007) for a review of this literature.
5Throughout this paper we use ‘patience’ as convenient shorthand for a tendency to delay the receipt of income,
holding other conditions (prices, amount of delay), constant. Since ‘patience’ is sometimes also used, more specifi-
cally, to refer to an absence of present bias in a structural model of choice, we will be explicit whenever we discuss
present bias per se.
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beverage prior to the time preference elicitation are more patient, but that a placebo beverage
produces a similar, albeit less powerful, effect. All these effects are economically significant in
magnitude, corresponding to large differences in demand for short-term loans.
Our structural estimates indicate that the clear majority of the effect of all of our treatments
(whether depletion, sugared drink or placebo drink) is not on the subjective discount rate or present
bias parameters, but on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Essentially, while subjects in all
treatments choose the same level of early income when early income is cheap, treated subjects are
much more likely to reduce their early income when its relative price rises. This suggests a model
in which all our treatments increase the amount of attention subjects devote to the intertemporal
allocation decision.6 This is consistent with Chabris, Laibson and Schuldt’s (2008) observation
that when subjects in experiments such as ours are considering their extra-laboratory options, their
choices should only reveal their available borrowing or saving rates. As such, subjects paying close
attention to the relationship of the lab options to the broader credit market should yield linear time
preference estimates (because of the arbitrage opportunities). An attention-based interpretation
of our results also seems consistent with our finding that all our treatment effects vanish in a
subsample with very high cognitive abilities; these subjects exhibit the same (high) level of price-
sensitivity regardless of how we treat them.
While our experimental environment is highly abstract, we are encouraged by the fact that a
number of economic studies in context-rich environments suggest that attention is a key factor in
decision quality. Carroll et al. (2009) show that simply manipulating the default savings plan is
a powerful tool for increasing individual savings, indicating limited attentiveness to the decision.
They also find that forcing an active choice improves choices. The common thread linking this
literature, our results and the economic theory is that the temptation individuals face has much more
to do with the time and effort needed to make the right decision than the actual utility ramifications
of their choices, which in our experiment –and in most existing experiments on intertemporal
choices– are likely small.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly considers the related
6Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) model the effects of attention on intertemporal choices and argue that models with
limited attention can explain a number of anomalies and stylized facts concerning intertemporal choice patterns.
7For direct evidence that willpower-based models of intertemporal choice are more relevant for the exertion of
effort than financial choice, see Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2012).
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literatures. Section 3 details the experimental design. We present our data analysis in Section 4
while Section 5 discusses our results and concludes.
2 Related Literature
In addition to the psychological literature on willpower and economists’ theoretical models of
self-control discussed above, our paper contributes to four literatures. One of these is a small
empirical literature in economics on the effects of willpower depletion and nutrition on choices
and effort. Concerning willpower depletion, Bucciol, Houser and Piovesan (2011) demonstrate
that productivity of younger children in a simple craft task is negatively affected by prior exposure
to consumption temptation. Suggestive of our own findings, Burger, Charness and Lynham (2011)
showed that the same depletion task used on our paper –the Stroop (1935) task– improves long-run
task completion rates in a procrastination study. Concerning nutrition, a small labor economics
literature studies the effects of breakfast programs in schools. For example, Dotter (2013) uses a
natural experiment to show that universally-free breakfast programs have large positive effects on
both math and reading scores.8
Second is a literature on the both the direct and mediating effects of cognitive ability economic
decisions, including those involving time preference. For example, strong correlations have been
found between childrens’ ability to resist temptation in the famous marshmallow experiment (Mis-
chel, Ebbesen and Raskoff Zeiss 1972) and a variety of cognitive outcomes, including SAT scores
(Shoda, Mischel and Peake 1990), IQ (Funder and Block 1989) and college GPA (Kirby, Winston
and Santiesteban 2005). Other studies that have linked intelligence with discounting include Fred-
erick (2005), Dohmen et al. (2010) and Shamosh and Gray’s (2008) meta-analysis. In a large-scale
experiment with trainee truckers, Rustichini et al. (2012) also establish that time preferences are
influenced by cognitive ability, while Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2013) link “anomalous time
preferences” with lower cognitive ability.
Methodologically, this paper contributes to two budding experimental literatures. The first is
the measurement of time preferences. We modify the Convex Time Budget technique of Andreoni
8Foundational to this study is Wesnes et al. (2003), which finds that breakfast interventions do increase attention
and memory. Notably, a glucose drink alone increased the speed at which items could be retrieved from memory for
90 minutes following consumption.
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and Sprenger (2012) by first identifying the annual interest rates of relevant market options to
our subject pool, and then calibrating the budgets we offer to detect differences in discounting
over this exact range. Our results showcase estimates in the heart of this range. Additionally,
our experiment is one of very few that is designed explicitly to examine treatment effects on the
parameters of structural model. Callen et al. (2013) and Carvalho, Prina and Sydnor (2013) do so
with risk preferences and violent trauma and time preferences and savings accounts respectively.
This technique can provide a deeper understanding of the treatment effects in question, allows for
more flexible policy analysis and if designed properly, permits standard reduced-form analysis as
well.
The two most closely related papers to ours are Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) and Wang and
Dvorak (2010), who respectively find that experimenter-induced positive affect and sucrose con-
sumption lead to more patient choices between money received today versus later. In addition to
Ifcher and Zarghamee’s focus on a different intervention than us (and the fact that neither paper
studies the effects of a willpower-depleting activity), the key differences between our study and
both these analyses are our ability to study placebo effects (by comparing the sugar-free drink to
no drink); a time-preference elicitation procedure that allows us to distinguish treatment effects on
discounting, present bias and price-sensitivity; and our analysis of the mediating effect of cognitive
ability. Together, these aspects of our approach provide important additional information regarding
the mechanisms behind all our treatment effects.
In particular, the patience-enhancing effects of consuming a sugar-free drink –which turn out to
be larger than the additional effect of the sugared drink– suggest important effects of the immediate
choice environment on patience that are unrelated to blood glucose. In addition, the finding that
all our main treatment effects operate not on discounting or present bias but on price sensitivity,
combined with the mediating role of cognitive ability, suggests that the dominant mechanism –
which we argue involves attention– may be quite different from those implied by risk-sensitive
foraging theory (Stephens and John 1986), or models based on self-regulatory strength (Gaillot et
al. 2007).9
9Wang and Dvorak argue that their findings are consistent with risk-sensitive foraging theory, which posits that
sugar-induced increases in the body’s energy budget should induce organisms to be more future-oriented to increase
the chance of reproductive success.
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3 The Experiment
3.1 Treatments
Our experiment consists of three types of sessions: Baseline, Depletion and Drink. Within each
session type, there are five distinct parts, the orders of which change across session type. In a
Drink session, the phases are: (1) consumption of drink and entry questions, (2) rest to allow any
sucrose in the drink to be metabolized into blood glucose, (3) elicitation of time preferences, (4)
depletion of self-control in the Stroop test, and (5) an exit survey that includes Frederick’s (2005)
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The structure of the Baseline sessions is similar to that of Drink
sessions, except that no beverage is given. In Depletion sessions, we invert the order between the
Stroop test and the elicitation of time preferences. Finally, within the Drink sessions, we have two
conditions corresponding to a drink containing sugar or a sugar-substitute. These variations give
us four treatments: Baseline, Depletion, Placebo and Sugar. Table 1 lays out the progression of the
experiment for each treatment.
Table 1 about here
The comparison between the Depletion treatment and the Baseline allows us to determine
whether performing an initial task that requires impulse control affects the decision to defer in-
come in the time preference task. The comparison between the Sugar treatment and the Placebo
treatment allows us to study whether the consumption of sugar affects time preferences. Finally,
if time preferences react to the consumption and metabolization of sucrose rather than the drink
itself, we expect to observe no differences in choices when comparing the Placebo treatment and
the Baseline. We discuss each task and drink consumption in more detail below.
3.2 Time Preference Elicitation
To elicit time preferences, we implement the Convex Time Budget (CTB) method of Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012, henceforth AS). This approach allows us to estimate individual-specific preference
parameters.
In every choice, participants received a budget of 16 tokens to allocate between an early pay-
ment, ct, and a late payment, ct+k, with t the early payment date and k the delay between the two
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dates. Participants made 45 allocation decisions and one of these decisions was randomly selected
at the end of the session for actual payment according to the allocation of tokens between the two
dates. The 45 budgets combine three early payment dates (t = 0, 5, 15 weeks), three delay lengths
(k = 5, 10, 15 weeks) and various price ratios. Thus, there were only seven paydays evenly spaced
at five weeks intervals (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 weeks). For each (t, k) combination, participants
had to make five decisions involving various interest rates. We defined three rate progressions that
were combined with the various early payment dates while the combination of budget progressions
and delay lengths were kept constant. The value of a token at the late date, at+k, was always equal
to e1, while the value of the token at the early date, at, varied between a minimum of e0.67 and
a maximum of e0.99. Allocating all the tokens to the late payment date paid e16; allocating all
the tokens to the early payment date paid a minimum of e10.72 and a maximum of e15.84. The
progressions were defined in order to offer implied annual interest rates, compounded quarterly,
between 4% and 845%. Table A1 in the Appendix presents all the choice sets.
The presentation of the 45 decisions was very similar to that in AS. A choice screen had nine
decision tabs that were displayed successively and corresponded to the nine (t, k) combinations.
The order between the nine tabs was randomly and independently determined for each participant
to control for order effects. Each decision tab displayed five budget decisions presented in order
of increasing gross interest rate. To facilitate decision-making by a better visualization of delays,
each decision tab displayed a dynamic calendar highlighting the current date, the early date and the
late date in different colors. It also displayed the values of a token at the early date and at the late
date, together with the values in Euros of the earnings corresponding to the decisions. A sample
decision tab is reproduced in the Appendix. The boxes for entering the allocation decisions were
initially blank. As soon as a value was entered either for the early date or the late date, the other
box was filled automatically to ensure that the total budget was 16 tokens and the corresponding
payoffs in Euro at the two dates were also displayed.
This design allows us to estimate for each individual her discount rate, the curvature of her
utility function (through the variations of k and of the gross interest rate), and her present bias and
hyperbolic discounting (through the variation of t). In addition, it allows us to examine which, if
any, of these dimensions is impacted by self-control depletion and sucrose consumption.
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3.3 Willpower Depletion
We used a Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) to deplete self-control as shown by studies in social psychol-
ogy (for a survey of the test, see MacLeod 1991). In a typical Stroop test, individuals have to read
the color of ink used to write words independently of the color names of words. In some trials,
there is congruence between the color of the word and the color of the ink (the word “yellow” is
written in yellow) but in other trials there is no congruence (the word “yellow” is written in red and
the correct answer is red). The incongruent stimuli typically require more time and produce more
mistakes than the congruent stimuli because the brain automatically decodes the semantic meaning
of the word and needs to override its first reaction to identify the color of the ink. Shortcutting the
automatic process requires self-control.
In our experiment, the participants’ computer screen displayed a series of color words (black,
blue, yellow, green and red) successively, and the participants were instructed to indicate, as
quickly and accurately as possible, the ink color in which the word was written. The list of pos-
sible colors was displayed at the bottom of the screen and the participants had to press the button
corresponding to the color of the ink, whether or not that matched the color name of the word (see
instructions in Appendix). They had to complete congruent and incongruent Stroop trials in ran-
dom order for 6 minutes. On average they completed 126 trials (S.D. = 11.69). As expected, the
time spent on incongruent words was significantly higher than on the congruent words (two-tailed
t-test, p < 0.001).
3.4 Drink Consumption
Following Gailliot et al. (2007), participants in each Drink session were given 14 ounces (40
centiliters) of a soft drink sweetened either with sugar or with a sugar substitute. Both types of
drinks had the same appearance. The sugared drink contained 158 kilocalories and the placebo
drink contained 10.10 We used a double blind procedure to administer the drinks: neither the
participants nor the experimenters were aware of the sugar content of the beverage.
After being invited to drink the beverage, participants could rest in silence and read magazines
10Specifically, the drinks were Fanta “Citron frappe´” and Fanta Zero “Citron frappe´”. They were dispensed in
glasses (not the original container) and appear identical (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Neither contains caffeine,
though both contain ascorbic acid (vitamin C).
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that we distributed during 10 minutes in order to allow the sucrose to be metabolized into glucose.
Three minutes before the end of this period, participants had to assess the beverage and to report
their usual consumption of soft drinks.11 In the Baseline and the Depletion treatment, the same rest
period of 10 minutes was implemented.
3.5 Procedures
The experiment was computerized, using the REGATE-NG software. It consisted of 8 sessions
conducted at the laboratory of the GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de The´orie Economique) institute
in Lyon, France. Undergraduate students from the local engineering and business schools were
invited via the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004). Between 17 and 20 participants took part in each
session, for a total of 149 participants. Two sessions of the Baseline treatment were implemented
with a total of 34 participants; two sessions of the Depletion treatment were implemented involving
40 participants; and four Drink sessions were implemented with 75 participants (37 in the sugar
condition and 38 in the placebo condition).
The invitation message addressed to the participants of all treatments indicated that they may
possibly have to drink a beverage containing sugar during the session and that individuals suffering
or thinking that they may suffer from a pathology linked to blood glucose regulation (like diabetes)
should abstain from participating. After signing up, all the participants in all the treatments were
instructed not to drink or eat at least three hours prior to the beginning of the session in order
to stabilize blood glucose levels. Upon arrival we recorded the time of their last intake. Since
chronobiology may influence economic decision-making (see Dickinson and McElroy, 2010), all
the sessions were run at noon, when the level of blood glucose is low.12
Upon arrival, the participants had to sign a consent form reminding them that they should
not participate if they suffer from a disease related to failure of blood sugar regulation. Then
participants randomly drew a tag from a bag assigning them to a terminal. The instructions for
11The questions were: 1) Please rate your enjoyment of the beverage you just consumed, between 1 and 10. 2) How
many calories do you think the beverage contained? 3) How often do you drink soft drinks (Coke, Pepsi, lemonade,
...): every day / every week / once or twice a month or less / less than twice a month? Although participants in the
Placebo condition assessed the beverage less positively (mean = 4.55, S.D.= 2.77) than those in the Sugar condition
(mean = 5.57, S.D. = 2.58) (two-tailed Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.097), they did not realize that they received a placebo.
Indeed, they predicted the same number of calories contained in the beverage (mean = 124.16, S.D. = 86.26) than the
participants placed in the Sugar condition (mean = 140.41, S.D. = 98.26) (p = 0.497).
12We did not measure individuals’ baseline blood glucose level, which would have required taking blood samples.
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each segment were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter after the completion of the prior
segment (see Appendix).
The elicitation of time preferences requires very strict procedural rules. To participate in the
experiment, the students were required to own a personal bank account and were informed by the
invitation message that they would be paid by a wire transfer to their bank account; they were
required to bring us a bank statement.13 During the session, instructions informed the participants
that a show-up fee of e5 ($6.5) would be wired to their bank account in addition to their other
payoffs at two different dates, regardless of their decisions: half of the show-up fee amount would
be paid at the early date and the other half at the late date indicated by the decision randomly
selected at the end of the session for payment. The show-up fee had no differential influence on the
45 allocation decisions. Participants were also informed that the dates mentioned on the decision
screens were the dates at which the wire transfers would be ordered by the finance department.14
To maximize the confidence of the participants about the payment of their earnings, they received
a document stating that the bank transfer would be ordered by the National Center for Scientific
Research (CNRS).15 In addition, the document mentioned the name, email address and phone
number of the professor in charge of the experiment who could be contacted in case of any problem
with the payment.
At the end of each session, participants received a feedback on the decision randomly selected
for payment, indicating their payoffs and the dates of the two wire transfers for this decision.
Then, they had to complete an exit survey which included questions about their demographics
and average mark on the final high school exam (Baccalaure´at). Sessions lasted 60 minutes and
participants averaged earnings of e20.43 ($26.62, with a standard deviation of e0.97 ($1.26),
including the show up fee.
13We cannot rule out that the information given in the message (payment wired to the bank account and possibility
of having to drink a beverage) has led to a self-selection of participants. However, the sessions were booked as quickly
as usual. In addition, we asked 44 students participating in another experiment with standard cash payment whether
they owned a personal bank account; all of them answered positively. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the
two criteria for participating were correlated. Finally, the message did not mention that the payment could be made at
two different dates which could have generated some self-selection.
14The administration committed to respect exactly the dates of the transfers and sent us a feedback after each
payment. We believe the transaction costs associated with this payment methodology are lower than the typical
approach used in this type of experiment, which relies on personal checks or vouchers.
15In France, CNRS is a well-known science and technology public agency. It employs 25,000 people and it operates
through 1,235 research institutes. Students are aware that the GATE institute is operated by both the CNRS and the
University of Lyon.
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4 Results
We present our results in four sections. The first section establishes a number of basic patterns
in a pooled sample of all treatments, to provide context for the study of treatment effects. The
second and third sections are nonparametric and structural approaches to analyzing the treatment
effects, respectively. The final section presents some robustness checks. Since one of our central
questions is how the impact of treatment manipulation on patience is mediated by the subjects’
cognitive ability, and since a large share of our subjects has very high cognitive skills relative to
the French population, we present most of our experimental results separately according to our
subjects’ reported achievement on the French Baccalaure´at exam.16 To maximize statistical power,
we simply divide our participants in half relative to the median score in our sample, which was 16.
Importantly, because only 9% of French Baccalaurat recipients earned a score of 16 or higher (our
participants are drawn from selective universities), we refer to our two groups as “high score” and
“lower score” respectively. Our high-scoring subjects clearly represent an elite level (about the
top decile) of achievement among French high school graduates, while our lower-scoring group
roughly represents the 50th through 90th percentiles. Thus the results for our lower-scoring group
are more representative of a typical high school graduate in France, and we focus much of our
discussion on that group.17
4.1 Overall Features of Behavior
We start by presenting two foundational results that verify aspects of our model and design, plus
some simple descriptive statistics for the pooled sample across all treatments. The first result is
that subjects’ aggregate demand curves in the experiment satisfy two general predictions of utility-
maximizing intertemporal behavior.
Result 1 - Consistent with predictions for agents who discount the future and have some pref-
erence curvature, mean demand for early income exceeds half the 16-token endowment at interest
16The French Baccalaure´at exam (le bac) is taken at the end of high school (lyce´e). In 2012, slightly over three
quarters of French youth had passed the Baccalaure´at.
17The results of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) performed at the end of the sessions are highly correlated with
Baccalaure´at score, and we can replicate all our main results using this measure of cognitive ability as well. However
since subjects’ CRT results could be affected by our treatments, we focus on the Baccalaure´at-score based results.
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rates near zero, then declines monotonically with the price of early income. This behavior charac-
terizes both high- and lower-score participants.
A simple but general model of choice between early and late tokens for any combination of
early payment date (t) and delay (k) supposes that subjects solve
max
X,Y
U(X) + λU(Y ), subject to RX + Y ≤M (1)
where X is experimental income received in the early period, Y is experimental income received
in the later period, U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, R is the price of sooner income, and M is the endowment.
In (1), λ < 1 can depend on both t and k to incorporate both discounting and present bias, but is
fixed within any (t, k) cell. R, on the other hand, varies within a (t, k) cell as we experimentally
manipulate the implied interest rate. For this model of preferences, Figure 1 illustrates (a) that
subjects should consume more than half their endowment in the early period (X > 8) when R = 1
because λ < 1, and that X should fall monotonically as R rises because income and substitution
effects reinforce each other when the endowment is all in the later period, as is the case in our
experiment.18
Figure 1 about here
Both these predictions are confirmed by the evidence in Figure 2, which plots the demand
curves for the early payment (X), separately by score and pooled across all treatments. With the
exception of the shortest delay length and latest start date for both groups, the demand curves all
start at above eight units of X at levels of R closest to one, then fall monotonically as R rises.19
The success of these basic predictions suggests that our participants’ choices are informative for
the preferences we wish to study.
18Alert readers will note that equation (1) models demand for early versus late experimental payments in the same
way economists typically model intertemporal consumption choices. Of course, if subjects choose total consumption
according to (1) but have access to perfect capital markets, their demand for experimental payments will consist of
corner solutions (i.e. either X = 0 or Y = 0) that maximize the market value of experimental payments. Effectively,
subjects would behave as if the U function had little or no curvature. We test this idea formally in Section 4.3 and
argue that it may shed some light on the possible mechanisms behind our estimated treatment effects.
19Because we do not observe choices from a zero-interest budget and Figure 2 indicates substantial non-linearity
in the demand curves, we used our structural model to estimate choices at R = 1 to further test the prediction about
income levels when R = 1. We found strong support, for all combinations of delay length and whether the early
payment occurs immediately. The minimum predicted zero-interest demand is e9.32 (S.E. = 0.25).
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Figure 2 about here
Result 2 - There is evidence of small but significant present bias in our data, among both high-
and lower-test score participants.
Participants receive the first of their two payments either on the day of the experiment, 5 weeks
after the experiment or 15 weeks after the experiment. To test formally for present bias we regress
early payments on dummy variables for t = 5 and t = 15 as well as the price ratio while clustering
standard errors at the individual level.20 Table 2 presents the results of these regressions. If the
date of first payment is immediate rather than 5 or 15 weeks in the future, lower-score subjects
borrow significantly more of their endowment. High-score subjects do the same for only the 15
week delay.
Table 2 about here
Finally, we note that there are only small and statistically insignificant differences between
the early payment choices of high- and lower-Baccalaure´at-score participants in our overall sam-
ple which combines all treatments. Specifically, lower-score participants select a slightly higher
overall level of early payment, and display slightly more present bias (which may be taken as a
proxy of impulsivity), but neither gap is significant at conventional levels.21 As the next section
shows, however, this aggregate result obscures sizeable differences in the effects of treatment on
the behavior of high- versus lower-score participants.
4.2 Simple Estimates of Treatment Effects
Our first look at the effects of the various treatments is non-parametric. Figure 3 presents the
mean demand for early payments across the Baseline, Depletion, Placebo and Sugar treatments by
20A regression approach is necessary because price ratios are not exactly balanced across the t dimension.
21Averaged across all choices, lower-score participants allocate aboute0.70 more experimental income (S.E. = 0.54,
clustered by individual) to the earlier payment date than high-score participants. This difference is not significant. We
add interaction terms between the dummy variables for t = 5 and t = 15 and high-score as well as a high-score level
effect into the present bias regressions from Table 2. The gap between early demand when t = 0 versus t = 5 is
about e0.31 smaller for high-score participants, but this difference is not significant (S.E. = 0.38). The signs and
significances of the non-interacted dummies are unaffected.
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Baccalaure´at score. Since these comparisons are between individuals, the treatments are balanced
with respect to prices, delays and start dates.
Figure 3 about here
Result 3 - For the lower test score sample, depletion, a sugared drink and a non-sugared drink
all reduce the demand for early payment. All of these treatment effects are absent among partici-
pants with very high test scores.
The p-values in Figure 3 indicate that all three treatments reduce demand for early income
amongst lower-score participants, with particularly strong sugar effects (p = 0.003) and depletion
effects (p = 0.046). The placebo effect is significant (p = 0.093), but is almost half the magnitude
of the sugar effect; the difference between the two effects is significant (p = 0.056), indicating that
the sugar treatment had effects on choice above and beyond that of the placebo.22 On the other
hand, only the sugar treatment affects the demand for early income significantly (and positively)
of the high-score subjects (p = 0.082). This effect is not significantly different from the placebo
effect at conventional levels (p = 0.143) however.
A final noteworthy finding in Figure 3 is that high- and lower-score subjects differ substantially
in their Baseline choices. The difference of e3.07 between the groups’ early payment demand in
the Baseline is significant (p = 0.011). Recalling that there was no significant difference between
high- and lower-score participants overall, this suggests that, in essence, our three interventions
have the effect of narrowing the behavioral difference between high- and lower-score partici-
pants by reducing lower-scoring participants’ demand for early income. The next result probes
the sources of this difference-reducing effect further.
Result 4 - The negative effect of all three treatments on lower-score participants’ demand for early
payment is strongest in cases where the price of early income is high.
22We use participants’ estimates of the calories their beverage contained in order to ascertain whether this difference
is due to psychology or physiology. Amongst lower-score subjects, there is no evidence that the magnitude of the
Sugar-Placebo gap is affected by the beliefs about the drink or that beliefs themselves generate differences in demand.
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Figures A2 and A3 in Appendix plot the demand curves for early payments for each (t, k) pair
for lower-score and high-score participants, respectively. The lower-score participants exhibit a
similar level of demand across all treatments at low price levels. As the price of early income
rises, early payments decline more rapidly in the Depletion, Sugar, and Placebo treatments than
in the Baseline. The high-score participants show a similar level of demand to the lower-score
participants at low prices, but demand is highly price-sensitive in all four treatments. In this sense,
the treatments appear to make the lower-score participants more price-sensitive, and thus more
similar to the high-score participants’ behavior.
To determine the statistical significance of the above effects, we define three price levels based
on the relative value of early tokens. When early tokens are worthe0.90 or more we say the price is
low, when they are worth betweene0.80 ande0.90, we say the price is medium and when they are
worth e0.80 or less, we say the price is high.23 Table 3 presents OLS regressions of early payment
demand on the treatment dummy variables split by price level. At medium and high prices all
three treatments have significant effects for the lower-score group and the magnitude of the sugar
effect is larger at high as opposed to low prices. The sugar effect is significantly greater than the
placebo effect in the medium price condition (p = 0.003) and borderline significantly greater in the
high price condition (p = 0.105). Column (3) suggests an elasticity-reducing effect of the Sugar
treatment on the high-score subjects, but the effects are not statistically different from the Placebo
effects in either medium or high price condition (p = 0.132 and p = 0.218 respectively).
Table 3 about here
In sum, our nonparametric analysis shows that all three treatments (Depletion, Placebo and
Sugar) reduce early demand among subjects with lower Baccalaure´at test scores, who are more
representative of the educated French population than our high-test score sample. This apparent
increase in ‘patience’ occurs only when the price of early income is high, so the treatments ef-
fectively make lower-score subjects more price-sensitive and therefore their overall behavior more
similar to our ‘elite’ sample.
23Note that this definition focuses on the most salient aspect of the price presented to the participants: the changing
value of an early token within a particular choice screen (t, k combination). Thus, the ranking is different than one
based on annualized interest rate.
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4.3 Treatment Effects in a Structural Model of Time Preferences
To measure whether the treatments affected different aspects of participants’ preferences,24 we now
estimate a simple structural model of intertemporal preferences in which the treatments can affect
each one of the fundamental utility parameters (specifically, their discount rate, present bias and
intertemporal substitution parameters). One primary advantage of the CTB method is that it allows
for the precise estimation of the parameters of structural models of intertemporal choice, even on
the individual level. We will consider two types of structural treatment effects: aggregate and
individual. Aggregate effects will compare one treatment-specific parameter estimate to another
and individual effects will compare the set of individual-specific parameter estimates within one
treatment to those from another. The two approaches yield similar results. As in section 4.2,
splitting the sample by test score is essential for understanding the treatment effects.
We first provide a characterization of an individual’s decision problem. Consider individual i
making decision j. Continue to denote X as the number of tokens received at the earlier date and
Y the number at the later date. Individual i is assumed to have power income utility (with exponent
α) that is additively separable across time periods in a β-δ form (Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and
Rabin 1999). Choice j is characterized by the price of sooner income, R, a delay between the two
payment dates, k, and an indicator for whether or not the sooner date is today, T (equal to 1 if t
= 0, and 0 otherwise). As in equation (1), M is the total number of tokens available. We suppose
that subjects optimize in the following way:25
(Xij, Yij) = argmax
X,Y
Xα + βTjδkjY α subject to RjX + Y ≤M. (2)
To identify preferences, we follow the approach of AS by applying non-linear least squares
(NLS) to the demand function for sooner tokens, derived directly from equation 2. This approach
24For example, while reduced utility curvature (higher α) is associated with higher price-sensitivity, it should also
increase the response to k (the gap between the payment dates). In general, because the demand functions implied by
most theoretically interesting demand functions are nonlinear, the predicted marginal effects of each parameter depend
on the levels of all the others, making simple regression tests only roughly informative about the effects of treatments
on preference parameters.
25Note that equation (1) implies that the set of available allocations is convex: that the tokens can be infinitely
divided. While we offer subjects 17 possible allocations along the budget frontier rather than an infinite number,
we argue that this is a suitable approximation to convexity. Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2013) perform a similar
exercise with 6 allocations and find no evidence of bias due to discretization.
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yields the structural regression equation
Xij =
M(βTj δ
k
jRj)
1
α−1
1 +Rj(βTj δ
k
jRj)
1
α0−1
+ ij. (3)
To analyze and test treatment effects, we replace α with
α1 + α2Di + α3Pi + α4Si, (4)
where D, P and S are treatment indicator variables, and make similar substitutions for β and δ.
Instead of presenting results on δ itself, we use r = δ−365 − 1, the yearly discount rate equivalent,
for ease of interpretation.
Setting out the structural form in (2)-(4) allows us to be more precise about how our manipu-
lations of the cognitive and physiological environments affect subjects’ intertemporal choices than
the more generic notions of ‘impatience’ or ‘impulsivity’. For example, if a treatment raises r, it
should increase subjects’ demand for early rewards relative to late rewards regardless of the amount
of delay between the two payment dates, and regardless of whether the early period corresponds
to the date of the experiment or a future date. If a treatment lowers β (the present bias parameter)
below 1, it increases subjects’ attraction only to rewards that are received on the date of the exper-
iment; high levels of present bias (low values of β) generate temporal inconsistencies in choices
that may correspond to psychological notions of a failure of willpower (i.e. a greater impulsive-
ness). Finally, if treatments increase α, they make subjects more responsive to the costs of early
income, which under some conditions (i.e. access to capital markets) might also be interpreted
as an ’improvement’ in the effectiveness of subjects’ decisions. All three notions are conflated in
the more amorphous notion of willpower that is often used to interpret experimental results on the
effects of willpower depletion.
We first estimated equation (3) without treatment effects, following our modification of the
CTB technique introduced by AS in the calibration of prices. Our estimate of the aggregate yearly
discount rate is 21.8% for lower-score types (S.E. = 5.9%) and 21.0% for high-score types (S.E.
= 4.1%).26 Our estimates of the β parameter are 0.976 (S.E. = 0.008) for lower-score and 0.988
26The corresponding specification from AS (Table 2, column (3)) estimates a rate of 37.7% with a standard error
of 8.7%. Because our max time horizon is slightly longer, we would expect a slightly lower estimate of the rate if
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(S.E. = 0.007) for high-score, with both values significantly less than 1 (p = 0.005 and p = 0.086,
respectively). Thus, in contrast to AS who estimate β = 1.007 (S.E. = 0.006), we find evidence of
present bias in the β-δ form.27 Lastly, we estimate a lower degree of curvature: α = 0.922 (S.E.
= 0.008) for lower-score and 0.942 (S.E. = 0.005) for high-score individuals as opposed to 0.897
(S.E. = 0.009) in AS.
Result 5 - The treatment effects on the structural parameters are concentrated on α, the utility
function curvature parameter. The magnitudes are economically significant at interest rates that
correspond to predatory credit instruments.
Table 4 presents estimates of treatment effects on the parameters of a common utility function,
shared by all individuals in each estimation sample. The treatment effects only show up as signif-
icant for utility curvature. Both Drink treatments significantly decrease lower-score curvature, but
the effect is significantly larger for the sugared drink (p = 0.020). While the high-score curvature
increase is significant only for the Sugar treatment, this effect is not significantly different from the
effect of the Placebo treatment (p = 0.167). In contrast to the simple estimates of treatment effects,
we do not see a significant effect of the Depletion treatment on the three utility parameters, taken
individually, amongst the lower-score group. However, depletion effects on both the present bias
and the curvature parameters have p-values below 0.15 and the joint hypothesis that these effects
are zero is rejected (p = 0.088). The two Drink treatments have significant joint effects as well.
All three effects on parameters are jointly different from zero in the Placebo treatment (p = 0.021)
and in the Sugar treatment (p = 0.001) in the lower-score sample. The Sugar treatment also has
a significant effect on all three parameters in the opposite direction in the high-score sample (p =
0.033).
Table 4 about here
The fact that the treatment effects operate through utility curvature is consistent with Result 4:
they make the lower-score individuals more price sensitive. In the limiting case where the utility
individuals display some insensitivity to the exactness of dates far in the future.
27While this magnitude of present bias over pure allocations of money is not economically meaningful in our
experiment, a 3% distortion of preferences could be very important for major financial decisions.
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function has no curvature, optimal choices move from one corner to the other as prices change. The
less curvature the function has, the closer we are to this case, and the more responsive individuals
will be. To illustrate this, consider subjects from our experiment making a decision about taking
a 2-week payday loan against a e1000 paycheck that comes with a 15% charge (APR = 390%).
Roughly, the optimal loan for a lower-score, Baseline treatment individual is e310, which results
in a e60 charge. Holding the discount and present-bias factors constant28 and switching to the
Depletion curvature estimate reduces the loan to e220 (charge of e40), the Placebo curvature
estimate to e140 (charge of e20) and the Sugar curvature estimate to e60 (charge of e10).
Turning now to our method that allows each subject to have his/her own set of utility param-
eters, (α, β and δ), we make a couple of adaptations that are dictated by the estimation results.
First, we drop 21 individuals who lack enough choice variation for the successful estimation of
the parameters. Second, because using the NLS technique with only 45 observations per subject
delivers some extreme outlying estimates, we trim the sample at the 5th and 95th percentiles of
the distribution of all three parameter estimates. This excludes 24 more subjects, leaving a sam-
ple of 104. Of the 45 excluded subjects, 28 are from the lower-score sample and 17 are from the
high-score sample.
Table 5 reports estimates of treatment effects on the individual-specific parameters using quan-
tile regressions at the median value of the estimate distribution. Specifically, for each of the three
parameters, we estimated a median regression on 104 observations in which the participant’s pa-
rameter estimate was the dependent variable and the three treatment indicators were the only re-
gressors. Standard errors for these estimates are obtained via bootstrap with 1000 replications.
The estimated individual effects are largely consistent with the aggregate effects. Both drinks sig-
nificantly decrease curvature in the lower-score sample. The depletion effect on curvature in the
lower-score sample is now marginally significant; whereas it was marginally insignificant in the
aggregate test. The Depletion and Sugar treatments appear to have minor present-bias inducing
effects for the high-score group.
Table 5 about here
28We do this to recognize that the effects we find on r and β are not estimated precisely. If we do take these effects
into account however, the gap between Baseline and the other treatments is larger. While the optimal loan remains at
e310 in Baseline, it is e160 in Depletion, e90 in Placebo and e30 in Sugar.
19
All three treatments increase the amount of deferred income for the lower-score individuals
by reducing utility curvature such that budgets featuring above-market interest rates generate large
differences in allocations versus the Baseline. There exists some evidence that the Sugar treatment
had stronger effects than the Placebo treatment.
4.4 Robustness
If time preferences are indeed dependent to a degree on physiological conditions, it would be
encouraging if our treatment effects were moderated by the condition in which individual subjects
entered the lab. While subjects were asked not to eat or drink for at least three hours prior to the
experiment, our survey indicated that there was substantial variation in the degree of adherence
to this request. Almost 19% of individuals report they had not eaten since the day before the
experiment and around 7% had eaten within the three hour window prior to the experiment. We
expect that subjects should have been more susceptible to the interventions the longer they went
without eating. Table 6 presents treatment effect regressions on demand for early payment with
interactions between the Depletion, Placebo and Sugar variables with the number of hours since
last meal.
Consistent with our baseline results, we find no significant treatment effects on the high-scoring
subjects; this group’s decisions are also unaffected by the amount of elapsed time since their last
meal. Lower-scoring subjects, on the other hand, become less patient as the time since their last
meal increases; this behavior is consistent with Briers et al.’s (2006) and Danziger et al.’s (2011)
evidence.29 Also, as predicted, lower-scoring subjects’ sensitivity to all three of our interventions
increases with elapsed time since their last meal.30 While this may not be surprising for the drink
treatments, it is perhaps noteworthy that “depleting” our subjects via the Stroop test also has a
larger patience-enhancing effect on hungry than on recently-nourished subjects. This finding re-
inforces our suggestion that engaging in a novel but cognitively demanding task can actually (at
29Briers et al. found that the desire for caloric resources increases the desire for money. Looking at decisions
made by an Israeli parole board, Danziger et al. found that parole was much more likely to be granted early in the
day than later in the day, conditional on crime, sentence and ethnicity. Since a judge’s reputation is harmed more
by inappropriately granting, as opposed to inappropriately refusing parole, fatigued judges ‘take the easy way out’
relative to rested judges. Following the board’s midmorning snack, there was a substantial spike in the percentage of
prisoners who were granted parole.
30Note that the uninteracted treatment effects no longer enter as significant because they are estimates specific to
the intercept where the time since last meal is zero.
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least temporarily) improve a vulnerable subject’s ability to focus on economic decisions.
Table 6 about here
To rule out mood or affect as potential drivers of our sugar or placebo effects, we use the
elicited mood and beverage enjoyment data from the post-drink surveys (Drink treatments) and
entry surveys (Baseline treatment).31 First and foremost, mood is not predictive of demand in
our experiment. Second, we use a specification identical to our hours-since-last-meal analysis,
but replace that variable with the self-reported mood variable, and exclude individuals from the
Depletion treatment (since their mood elicitation took place prior to the Stroop task). Results
are in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. We again find no substantive evidence that mood is related
to demand for lower-score participants,32 and weak evidence that high-score participants in the
placebo condition may demand smaller early payments as their mood improves.33
To add credence to our use of the Baccalaure´at exam score as a measure of cognitive ability, we
present treatment effect estimates split by CRT performance instead of by Baccalaure´at score.34 As
noted, these estimates should be interpreted with caution since the treatments may have affected the
subjects’ CRT performance, just as they affected the subjects’ performance in the time-preference
task. That said, consistent with our results using the Baccalaure´at, we find significant effects of the
treatments on time preferences only for those who failed to answer a single CRT question correctly
(slightly more than 70% of these individuals are in the lower-score group). Results are presented
in Table 7.
Table 7 about here
Finally, we note that while our structural demand equation (3) is for a continuous measure of
early income, our experimental subjects could choose only integer numbers of tokens; relatedly,
optimal choices in (3) approach corner solutions as the degree of preference curvature approaches
zero (α approaches one).35 To check whether this affects our estimates, we estimated specifications
31Both mood and beverage enjoyment are elicited as numbers from 1 (negative) to 10 (positive).
32The same is true of elicited beverage enjoyment.
33Attempts to replicate the Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) result by using our treatment variables as instruments
suffer from a lack of relevance: our treatments do not appear to affect mood.
34As mentioned earlier, CRT and Baccalaure´at performance are positively and significantly correlated.
35In fact, around 75% of choices in our experiment are at corners, reflecting the relatively low degree of estimated
preference curvature among our subjects, especially at high cognitive ability levels and in the presence of interventions
that reduce curvature.
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with three options: 1) sooner corner, 2) interior and 3) later corner using a multinomial logit
specification. Results are found in Appendix Table A4. Reassuringly, in the lower-score sample,
the probability of choosing the sooner corner is significantly lower in the Depletion and Sugar
treatments and the probability of choosing the later corner is significantly greater in the Depletion,
Sugar and Placebo treatments.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of experimental manipulations of prior impulse-controlling activity
and sugar consumption on time preferences. A key innovation of our approach is an explicit
model of intertemporal choice which allows us to distinguish three conceptually distinct aspects of
‘patience’ (the tendency to defer income) that might be affected by the cognitive and physiological
environment: discount rates, present bias, and price sensitivity. We find that intertemporal choices
are sensitive to transient features of the choice environment, but not necessarily in ways that are
consistent with a willpower-based model. Instead, exposure to the Stroop (1935) task prior to
the elicitation of time preferences makes lower-test-score participants more responsive to high
prices for early income. It is ‘as if’ the Stroop test primed the subjects to think more carefully
about their subsequent economic decisions. Our interpretation of this Depletion results is that
the ’attention/focusing’ effect of engaging in the Stroop task outweighs any effects of willpower
depletion on the subsequent time preference elicitation procudure. This interpretation is consistent
with Benartzi and Thaler’s (2001) and Beshears et al.’s (2011, 2013) evidence that simplifying the
choice environment improves financial decisions.36
In our Drink treatments, we find that drinking either the placebo beverage or the sugared bever-
age ten minutes prior to the time preference task also increases patience, and –like the Stroop task–
does so by raising subjects’ sensitivity to high prices. The magnitude of the sugar effect is signif-
icantly greater than the magnitude of the placebo effect, consistent with a role for blood glucose
in sustaining willpower. However, the finding that the placebo beverage has a level effect over the
36Our depletion result is also consistent with Tuk, Trampe and Warlop (2011)’s recent finding that increased urina-
tion urgency associated with a full bladder improves subjects’ ability to resist more immediate temptations in monetary
decision making, and with Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro’s (2013) evidence that interfering with individuals’ ability
to focus induces small-stakes risk aversion.
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baseline raises questions about the role of blood glucose per se. Indeed, recent findings by Molden
et al. (2012) and Sanders et al. (2012) show that simply rinsing one’s mouth with a sugared bever-
age without swallowing (with no effect on blood glucose) bolsters impulse control in similar ways
to ingesting sugar; related neurological evidence indicates that the sensing of the carbohydrate in
the mouth activates a part of the brain that is highly sensitive to incentives (Kringelbach 2004;
Chambers, Bridge and Jones 2009). Since our placebo drink did contain a very small amount of
sugar –though not enough to affect blood glucose levels– this mechanism could account for our
findings.
An alternative explanation of our estimated Drink effects is a substitution between primary and
secondary rewards. Indeed, the drink –whether sugared or not– could be perceived as a reward,
since participants were asked not to eat or drink for three hours prior to the experiment. Consistent
with the notion of a common neural value of rewards (see Dreher 2009), receiving a drink as a
reward may reduce participants’ desire for an immediate secondary reward (i.e. money on the day
of the experiment). Or, in line with Briers et al. (2006), it may decrease the desire for immediate
financial resources. One difficulty with this hypothesis, however, is that the drinks should act
primarily on subjects’ present bias, not on their price-sensitivity as we observe; the drinks should
also affect both lower- and higher-score subjects, which is not what we observe.37
Finally, a more ‘economic’ mechanism that could explain our results relates to a critique of
time-preference elicitation experiments (Chabris, Laibson and Schuldt 2008), namely that the
choices of agents with access to capital markets and awareness of the rates they face in such mar-
kets should be more informative about their capital market options than their subjective preference
parameters. Specifically, in our convex environment these agents should pick corner solutions that
depend on whether the gross interest rate on a particular choice is above or below their outside
rate option. While our Drink and Depletion treatments cannot, of course, affect our participants’
capital market options, it is possible that they affected the extent to which participants had the
mental energy or focus to incorporate those options into their decisions. Such increased sensitivity
to outside rates would make our estimated indifference curves less convex (linear in the extreme),
37Alternatively, the drinks could satisfy a different biological need than the need for energy (i.e. quenching thirst).
Relieving subjects’ thirst may improve their ability to concentrate on the time choice task compared with the Baseline
treatment. Unlike the reward substitution hypothesis, this mechanism seems more consistent with the fact that the
treatments operate via price-sensitivity rather than present bias or discount rates.
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and thus be reflected in our estimates of α. Carvalho, Prina and Sydnor (2013) study the effects of
randomly providing individuals with a savings account on time preferences. Echoing our results,
their treatment effects are concentrated on utility curvature: subjects with new accounts exhibit
more linear preferences, suggesting increased sensitivity of choices to market options.
An additional feature of our estimated treatment effects is that they are large in magnitude.
We estimate that lower-score subjects in our Baseline treatment would demand an advance of
e310 when offered a 2-week payday loan that comes with a 15% charge (APR = 390%), for
a total loan charge of e60. Our Depletion treatment reduces the desired loan to e220 (charge
of e40). The Placebo treatment further reduces loan demand to e140 (charge of e20) and the
Sugar treatment to e60 (charge of e10).38 Payday loans such as the above are considered by
many to be ‘predatory’ in that their short-term nature takes advantage of scope insensitivity in
interest rates to charge astronomical rates. In these situations, our finding that all of the treatment
effects operate through the intertemporal elasticity of substitution indicates that unless consumers
are highly attuned to their task at hand, they may ignore substantial price differences across assets
or credit payments.39 This emphasizes the need to both help consumers make active and aware
choices whenever possible and be vigilant in preventing firms from purposefully taking advantage
of compromising cognitive environments.
As noted, all the above treatment effects are largely absent among subjects with very high
cognitive abilities (corresponding to the top decile of French high school graduates). That said,
our main results pertain to a subject pool whose cognitive ability is still well above the national
mean (representing about the 50th-90th percentiles of high school graduates). This suggests that
sensitivity of economic choices to transitory environmental features like those studied in this paper
is likely widespread in most populations of interest.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Treatment Task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Entry survey Rest
Time preference
Stroop task Exit survey
task
Depletion Entry survey Rest Stroop task
Time preference
Exit survey
task
Placebo
Sugar-free drink &
Rest
Time preference
Stroop task Exit survey
Entry survey task
Sugar
Sugared drink &
Rest
Time preference
Stroop task Exit survey
Entry survey task
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Figure 1: Predicted Behavior
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Figure 2: Demand Functions by Date of Early Payment, t, All Treatments
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Table 2: Effect of Start Date, t, on Early Payment Demand
Estimation Sample
All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score
(1) (2) (3)
Constant (t = 0, R = 1) 8.256 8.679 7.840
(0.437) (0.608) (0.627)
1(t = 5 weeks) -0.521∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗ -0.367
(0.192) (0.264) (0.278)
1(t = 15 weeks) -1.324∗∗∗ -1.308∗∗∗ -1.340∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.409) (0.403)
Normalized Price Ratio (R− 1) -21.365∗∗∗ -21.535∗∗∗ -21.197∗∗∗
(1.197) (1.723) (1.675)
Clusters 149 74 75
Observations 6705 3330 3375
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 45 observations (budgets) per cluster.
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Figure 3: Mean Demand by Treatment
p-values are generated from regressions of the chosen early payment on treatment status with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The
regression is run separately for lower- and high-score subjects. Each individuals makes 45 decisions, leaving us with a sample size of 3330 (74
clusters) in the lower-score group and 3365 (75 clusters) in the high-score group. An approach that collapses the data to individual-level means
yields similar results.
33
Table 3: Treatment Effect on Early Payment Demand by Price Level
Estimation Sample
All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score
(1) (2) (3)
Constant (Low price, Baseline) 7.976 8.809 6.449
(0.803) (1.036) (1.146)
Low price X Depletion -1.778 -2.585 -0.276
(1.093) (1.590) (1.460)
Low price X Placebo -0.865 -0.944 -0.492
(1.074) (1.316) (1.703)
Low price X Sugar -0.530 -2.569 1.444
(1.073) (1.567) (1.433)
Medium price -4.423∗∗∗ -3.848∗∗∗ -5.477∗∗∗
(0.534) (0.645) (0.876)
Medium price X Depletion -1.287 -2.559∗∗ 1.171
(1.862) (1.171) (0.844)
Medium price X Placebo -1.416∗ -2.578∗∗ 0.789
(0.793) (1.040) (0.754)
Medium price X Sugar -1.194 -4.321∗∗∗ 2.024∗∗
(0.803) (0.943) (0.657)
High price -5.764∗∗∗ -5.550∗∗∗ -6.157∗∗∗
(0.739) (0.831) (1.038)
High price X Depletion -0.806 -2.019∗∗ 1.264∗
(0.738) (1.010) (0.653)
High price X Placebo -1.393∗∗ -2.271∗∗ 0.268
(0.686) (0.967) (0.454)
High price X Sugar -1.208∗ -3.020∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗
(0.686) (0.883) (0.441)
Clusters 149 74 75
Observations 6705 3330 3375
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 45 observations (budgets) per cluster.
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Table 4: Treatment Effects on Aggregate Utility Parameter Estimates
Estimation Sample
All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score
(1) (2) (3)
α (Utility Curvature)
Constant (Baseline) 0.904 0.860 0.961
(0.015) (0.027) (0.007)
Depletion Effect 0.028 0.058∗ -0.016
(0.018) (0.031) (0.013)
Placebo Effect 0.042∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.016) (0.028) (0.013)
Sugar Effect 0.036∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.011)
β (Present Bias)
Constant (Baseline) 0.979 0.949 1.002
(0.016) (0.026) (0.013)
Depletion Effect 0.006 0.045 -0.023
(0.018) (0.027) (0.018)
Placebo Effect 0.004 0.031 -0.014
(0.018) (0.029) (0.018)
Sugar Effect 0.004 0.025 -0.016
(0.019) (0.029) (0.018)
r (Annual Discount Rate)
Constant (Baseline) 0.268 0.357 0.210
(0.106) (0.225) (0.068)
Depletion Effect -0.140 -0.267 -0.057
(0.124) (0.256) (0.097)
Placebo Effect -0.046 -0.076 -0.076
(0.121) (0.236) (0.114)
Sugar Effect -0.016 -0.219 0.109
(0.122) (0.237) (0.107)
Clusters 149 74 75
Observations 6705 3330 3375
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 45 observations (budgets) per cluster.
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Table 5: Treatment Effects on Median Individual Utility Parameter Estimates
Estimation Sample
All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score
(1) (2) (3)
α (Utility Curvature)
Constant (Baseline) 0.958 0.940 0.974
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Depletion Effect 0.016 0.023∗ 0.008
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Placebo Effect 0.012 0.027∗ 0.005
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
Sugar Effect 0.010 0.039∗∗∗ -0.011
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
β (Present Bias)
Constant (Baseline) 0.979 0.949 1.013
(0.026) (0.028) (0.014)
Depletion Effect -0.002 0.041 -0.035∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.016)
Placebo Effect 0.013 0.047 -0.023
(0.026) (0.030) (0.019)
Sugar Effect -0.001 0.018 -0.035∗
(0.029) (0.037) (0.019)
r (Annual Discount Rate)
Constant (Baseline) 0.323 0.490 0.323
(0.104) (0.250) (0.073)
Depletion Effect 0.048 0.017 -0.081
(0.143) (0.285) (0.140)
Placebo Effect 0.105 -0.040 -0.034
(0.148) (0.272) (0.192)
Sugar Effect -0.000 -0.311 0.109
(0.130) (0.273) (0.149)
Observations 104 46 58
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses. Parameter estimate distributions trimmed at the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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Table 6: Treatment Effect on Early Payment Demand with Meal Time Controls
Estimation Sample
All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score
(1) (2) (3)
Constant (Baseline, just ate) 2.838 2.360 3.735
(1.248) (1.287) (1.509)
Depletion Effect 1.357 1.281 1.401
(1.645) (2.069) (2.079)
Placebo Effect 0.080 1.419 -2.326
(1.524) (1.630) (2.159)
Sugar Effect 2.591∗ 1.102 2.090
(1.526) (1.700) (1.844)
Time since last meal (hours) 0.434∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ -0.049
(0.218) (0.155) (0.223)
Time X Depletion -0.474∗ -0.677∗∗∗ -0.217
(0.261) (0.241) (0.301)
Time X Placebo -0.183 -0.544∗∗ 0.421
(0.246) (0.214) (0.289)
Time X Sugar -0.608∗∗ -0.773∗∗∗ -0.122
(0.250) (0.232) (0.270)
Clusters 149 74 75
Observations 6705 3330 3375
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 45 observations (budgets) per cluster.
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Table 7: Treatment Effect on Early Payment Demand by CRT Score
Estimation Sample
CRT = 0 CRT = 1 CRT = 2 CRT = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant (Baseline) 6.916 5.061 3.039 4.654
(0.997) (0.965) (1.165) (2.410)
Depletion Effect -3.580∗∗ -1.457 0.796 1.296
(1.405) (1.635) (1.345) (3.015)
Placebo Effect -2.468∗ 0.251 0.096 -0.726
(1.240) (1.319) (1.653) (2.559)
Sugar Effect -2.409∗ -0.217 1.143. -0.299
(1.351) (1.260) (1.728) (2.599)
Clusters 42 40 40 27
Observations 1890 1800 1800 1215
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 45 observations (budgets) per cluster.
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A Appendix for Online Publication
Table A1: The 45 Choice Sets in the Time Preference Elicitation Task
Parameter
Choice Early date Delay length Early value of Price of an Annual intrest Maximum early
number t k 1 token at early Euro rate % payoff
1 0 5 0.97 1.03 36 15.52
2 0 5 0.95 1.05 65 15.20
3 0 5 0.93 1.08 100 14.88
4 0 5 0.91 1.10 141 14.56
5 0 5 0.89 1.12 189 14.24
6 5 10 0.97 1.03 17 15.52
7 5 10 0.94 1.06 36 15.04
8 5 10 0.91 1.10 59 14.56
9 5 10 0.88 1.14 85 14.08
10 5 10 0.85 1.18 116 13.60
11 15 15 0.97 1.03 11 15.52
12 15 15 0.93 1.08 28 14.88
13 15 15 0.89 1.12 47 14.24
14 15 15 0.85 1.18 70 13.60
15 15 15 0.81 1.23 96 12.96
16 0 10 0.98 1.02 11 15.68
17 0 10 0.93 1.08 44 14.88
18 0 10 0.88 1.14 85 14.08
19 0 10 0.83 1.20 139 13.28
20 0 10 0.78 1.28 208 12.48
21 5 15 0.98 1.02 7 15.68
22 5 15 0.92 1.09 32 14.72
23 5 15 0.86 1.16 64 13.76
24 5 15 0.80 1.25 103 12.80
25 5 15 0.74 1.35 154 11.84
26 15 5 0.98 1.02 23 15.68
27 15 5 0.94 1.06 82 15.04
28 15 5 0.90 1.11 164 14.40
29 15 5 0.86 1.16 278 13.76
30 15 5 0.82 1.22 432 13.12
31 0 15 0.99 1.01 4 15.84
32 0 15 0.91 1.10 37 14.56
33 0 15 0.83 1.20 83 13.28
34 0 15 0.75 1.33 144 12.00
35 0 15 0.67 1.49 231 10.72
36 5 5 0.99 1.01 11 15.84
37 5 5 0.93 1.08 100 14.88
38 5 5 0.87 1.15 246 13.92
39 5 5 0.81 1.23 479 12.96
40 5 5 0.75 1.33 845 12.00
41 15 10 0.99 1.01 5 15.84
42 15 10 0.92 1.09 51 14.72
43 15 10 0.85 1.18 116 13.60
44 15 10 0.78 1.28 208 12.48
45 15 10 0.71 1.41 339 11.36
i
Figure A1: Glasses Containing either the Placebo or the Sugared Beverage
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Figure A2: Demand Functions by Treatment, Lower-Score Sample
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Figure A3: Demand Functions by Treatment, High-Score Sample
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Table A2: Treatment Effect on Early Payment Demand with Mood Controls
Estimation Sample
All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score
(1) (2) (3)
Constant (Baseline, neutral mood) 5.168 7.898 2.638
(2.506) (3.551) (2.112)
Placebo Effect -1.144 -1.922 -0.412
(0.834) (1.163) (0.998)
Sugar Effect -0.878 -3.407∗∗∗ 1.567∗
(0.847) (1.120) (0.900)
Mood (-5 to 5 scale) 0.046 -0.260 0.160
(0.438) (0.598) (0.424)
Mood X Placebo -0.383 0.381 -1.008∗
(0.539) (0.754) (0.586)
Mood X Sugar -0.141 0.648 -0.500
(0.527) (0.679) (0.558)
Clusters 109 55 54
Observations 4905 2475 2430
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 45 observations (budgets) per cluster. Mood is elicited on a 1-10 scale. We renormalize to
-5 to 5 such that treatment effect estimates refer to neutral mood.
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Table A3: Treatment Effect on Early Payment Demand with Drink Enjoyment Controls
Estimation Sample
All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score
(1) (2) (3)
Constant (Baseline, neutral enjoyment) 5.408 6.491 3.422
(0.674) (0.896) (0.681)
Placebo Effect -1.258 -1.852∗ 0.004
(0.809) (1.037) (1.021)
Sugar Effect -1.054 -3.344∗∗∗ 1.385
(0.803) (1.107) (0.862)
Placebo X Enjoyment (-5 to 5 scale) -0.231 -0.162 -0.318
(0.160) (0.172) (0.277)
Sugar X Enjoyment (-5 to 5 scale) 0.296∗ 0.072 0.373∗
(0.172) (0.191) (0.196)
Clusters 109 55 54
Observations 4905 2475 2430
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 45 observations (budgets) per cluster. Enjoyment is elicited on a 1-10 scale. We renormalize
to -5 to 5 such that treatment effect estimates refer to neutral enjoyment.
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Table A4: Treatment Effects on Probability of Corner Solution Choice
Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Model
Estimation Sample
All Subjects Lower-Score High-Score
Corner Choice: Sooner Later Sooner Later Sooner Later
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant (Basline) 0.242 0.472 0.287 0.344 0.161 0.706
(0.046) (0.060) (0.066) (0.072) (0.038) (0.069)
Depletion Effect -0.063 0.149∗ -0.142∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.049 -0.030
(0.057) (0.078) (0.084) (0.108) (0.058) (0.089)
Placebo Effect -0.055 0.111 -0.077 0.179∗ -0.009 -0.033
(0.054) (0.080) (0.075) (0.096) (0.059) (0.111)
Sugar Effect -0.061 0.060 -1.156∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.040 -0.217∗∗
(0.054) (0.078) (0.071) (0.105) (0.053) (0.091)
Clusters 149 74 75
Observations 6705 3330 3375
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 45 observations (budgets) per cluster. The multinomial logit specification estimates the
effect of our treatments on the probability of choosing either the sooner or later corner solution, with respect to an interior choice (all pooled). This
table presents the marginal effects of changing the treatment indicators from 0 to 1, holding the other indicators constant at 0.
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Instructions
You are about to participate in an experimental session on decision-making. 
The session consists of several parts. You will receive the instructions for each part after the 
previous part has been completed.
Part 1
Your computer screen will display a number of questions. We thank you for answering these 
questions with care.
Once all participants will have answered these questions, we will distribute glasses of a 
beverage that we will invite you to drink. Please do not drink the beverage before being 
expressly invited to do it.
Next, you will have to answer a few questions.
After you have answered these questions, you will have to wait for the next part. During this 
rest period, you are allowed to read books, newspapers or magazines. During this part and 
throughout the session, it is not allowed to talk to the other participants.
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Part 2
Your decisions
In this part, you will be asked to make a series of choices between payments you can receive 
at different dates. On each of nine decision screens, you will decide how to divide your 
payment for the experiment between two dates:  an ‘early’ date and a ‘late’ date.    
Altogether, you will make a total of 45 choices on the nine decision screens.  These decision 
screens will be displayed in a random order. You will have the following options for payment 
dates:
Decide between payment today and payment in 5 weeks
Decide between payment in 5 weeks and payment in 15 weeks
Decide between payment in 15 weeks and payment in 30 weeks 
Decide between payment today and payment in 10 weeks
Decide between payment in 5 weeks and payment in 20 weeks
Decide between payment in 15 weeks and payment in 20 weeks
Decide between payment today and payment in 15 weeks
Decide between payment in 5 weeks and payment in 10 weeks
Decide between payment in 15 weeks and payment 25 weeks
On each decision screen, we will provide you with the exact calendar dates of the above 
payments, so you know exactly which decision you are making.  Today’s date appears in 
green, the early payment date appears in blue and the late payment date appears in red.
You will be given 16 tokens to divide in each choice, but the value of a token changes from 
choice to choice.  The real money payments associated with your token choices will be 
automatically calculated for you to see as you make your decisions.  
To make your decisions, you can enter a number for the early payment (or the late payment) 
and move the up and down arrows. The box corresponding to the late payment (or the early 
payment, respectively) will be automatically updated by a number indicating the difference 
between 16 and the tokens assigned to the other date of payment.
Once you have completed a set of five decisions, you must press the “Validate” button to 
move to the next decision screen.
Below is an example of a decision screen.
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Your payment
At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select one of the 45 decisions 
you made to be your earnings from participating in this experiment.  
In addition, you will receive a €5 participation payment that will be split up into two 
payments of €2.50: one to go along with your earnings at  the early and late dates associated 
with the randomly selected decision.
This means that you will not be paid in cash today. You will be paid by checks that will be 
mailed to you at the address you will indicate on the envelopes on your desk. We will mail the 
envelopes at the dates corresponding to the randomly selected decision.
For example, if the selected decision indicates that you have chosen x tokens today and y
tokens in 10 weeks, we will mail the first check today and the second check in 10 weeks from 
today.
Remember that each decision could be the one that counts!  Treat each decision as if it could 
be the one that determines your payment.      
----
If you have any question on these instructions, please raise your hand and we will answer 
your questions in private.     
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Part 3
In this part, you will be presented with a series of color words (black, blue, yellow, green, 
red). These words will appear in different colors, sometimes matching the word (e.g., the 
word blue, written in blue), and sometimes not matching the word (e.g., the word blue, 
written in red).
Your job is to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible, the color in which the word is 
written, whether or not that matches the word itself. Click the button that matches the color of 
the word. Try not to pay attention to the word, but just the color.
This task will last for six minutes.
Example : 
In this example, the correct answer is « green ».
